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Key messages
• Understanding what makes collective action succeed can help 
in difficult areas like anti-corruption where frequent popular 
mobilisations have often delivered disappointing results. 
• A cost-benefit approach provides useful analytical insights 
but has limitations in practice. Possibilism downplays the 
usefulness of these calculations and says innovative solutions 
emerge through trial and error and learning from mistakes. 
But it too can have high failure rates. 
• Strategic realism agrees that some future costs and benefits 
are uncertain, but evidence-based analysis can identify 
strategies that are more likely to be implemented given 
the power and interests of key actors. This is the SOAS-
ACE strategy for identifying feasible and high impact anti-
corruption policies.
• The path to implementation can still face unexpected 
obstacles, as possibilism suggests, and require innovation and 
experimentation. But by pursuing feasible objectives, leaders 
greatly improve their chances of success.
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Good policies and institutions emerge when the 
collective action that supports them is more effective 
than the opposition. But what makes some collective 
action more effective than others? 2 
Understanding this better could help reform-minded 
leaders, particularly in areas like anti-corruption, 
where implementation has been particularly 
poor. There are different ways of thinking about 
why collective action succeeds but each suggests 
somewhat different answers. The cost-benefit 
approach, most often used by economists, provides 
useful insights about when and how collective action 
may be successful. But it has well-known limitations 
as a guide to policy. Two other approaches, possibilism 
and strategic realism, respond to these weaknesses 
and provide somewhat different advice. 
Early thinking on collective 
action
Collective action was first seen as a rational choice 
problem that could be understood by looking at the 
costs and benefits of individuals. In Mancur Olson’s 
(1965) classic work, The Logic of Collective Action, 
a group of individuals share a common interest in 
a collective goal, but when each individual decides 
whether or not to support that goal with their own 
time and money, they look at their private costs 
and benefits. 
Collective benefits (like living in a society free of 
corruption) often have qualities that economists 
describe as ‘public goods’: once there, everyone who 
can benefit will do so. But getting there may entail 
private costs in time and money and, subsequently, 
costs of complying with rules that are profitable to 
break. As a result, for the individual, not contributing to 
achieve the collective good, or (occasionally) breaking 
the rules once there, may be a rational choice. If 
rational calculations result in too many individuals free 
riding, the collective benefit is not achieved. 
Olson was interested in how collective action can 
succeed despite these perverse incentives. He did this 
by looking at the distribution of costs and benefits 
across individuals in a group and asking whether any 
single individual or subgroup may have the incentive 
to organise the achievement of the common good. 
This could happen if one or more individuals privately 
valued the good so highly that for them their private 
benefit was greater than their private cost. 
These individuals can play a leadership role by 
beginning to provide the collective good themselves, 
even if no-one else was contributing. The leaders 
can also organise schemes of redistributing some 
of the benefits of the collective action, or resources 
from unrelated activities, as selective incentives to 
members of the group to persuade them to start 
contributing. This can persuade a larger number of 
self-interested individuals to start contributing to 
the collective good. In some cases, leaders may also 
work to exclude individuals who do not contribute, for 
instance by negotiating agreements like closed shops 
that ensure that only members of a union who pay 
their dues can work in particular jobs. 
Olson’s economic calculus helped to identify some of 
the conditions that may enable successful collective 
action in a highly simplified model. He certainly 
realised that he was ignoring many other factors such 
as ideology or commitments to a shared community, 
but he was not convinced that these would suffice to 
override selfish interests on a big enough scale and 
on a sustained basis. Later work in this tradition also 
showed that much depends on the characteristics of 
the public good in question. 
To achieve ‘goods’ like anti-corruption or a rule of 
law, it is not enough that a few leaders begin to invest 
in their achievement. They require that everyone 
subject to specific rules voluntarily adhere to them 
and there is credible enforcement against occasional 
free riders. Nevertheless, Olson’s approach showed 
that if the distribution of the costs and benefits 
of the collective action was known, the likelihood 
of different strategies for overcoming free-riding 
behaviour could be computed. Later, game theory 
improved the sophistication of this analysis, showing 
how free riding may be contained in different ways in 
repeated games, for instance through different types 
of punishment strategies (Kreps 1990).
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Limitations of the cost-
benefit approach
Olson used the differences in costs and benefits across 
individuals to suggest leadership opportunities. But 
he did not recognize that these differences in interests 
may lead to resistance on distributive grounds. 
Distributive conflict should not be confused with 
free-riding behaviour. In the latter, individuals cheat 
despite wanting the collective action to succeed. In 
distributive conflicts, individuals resist because they 
object to the distribution of benefits that would come 
about, and they invest resources to ensure that it fails. 
A description of the benefits and costs of contributing 
to a strategy may not reveal who is likely to oppose 
it or how intense their resistance is likely to be. That 
requires a historical/political economy  understanding 
of the groups affected by the policy, their relative 
power and their likely responses. 
Some corruption is just free riding, for instance when 
tax collectors accept bribes from businesses to reduce 
their tax bills, but both depend on others paying taxes 
for their salaries and services. Here, detection and 
punishment may work because once detected, other 
businesses and bureaucrats will support enforcement. 
But other types of corruption may involve powerful 
groups colluding to capture benefits, sometimes quite 
openly. For instance, powerful businesses, politicians 
and bureaucrats may collude to evade taxes or default 
on loans and share the benefits. Here, detection and 
punishment may not work because these networks will 
behave as in a distributive conflict and spend time and 
resources to resist enforcement. For collective action 
to succeed in this case, it must identify a strategy led 
by a counter-coalition with the capability to overcome 
or bypass this resistance in its own interest. 
A second limitation of the cost-benefit approach 
is that in a world of uncertainty, it is difficult to 
precisely predict future costs and benefits such as 
future obstacles or how they may be overcome. 
As a result, unforeseen problems may cause the 
failure of apparently promising collective action, and 
unexpected opportunities may lead to resolutions that 
were not foreseen. 
Alternative approaches to 
understand collective action
Possibilism and strategic realism are responses to the 
limitations of the cost-benefit approach. 
Possibilism, associated with the work of Albert 
Hirschman (Adelman 2013; Lepenies 2008), argues 
that people often pursue collective goals without 
doing a cost-benefit calculation. More importantly, 
it describes how innovative solutions are discovered 
by learning from mistakes. Individuals clearly find 
social engagement valuable in itself. This can explain 
many types of social activism where the private 
benefit to individuals is not clear (though Olson may 
have said their behaviour reveals the value they put 
on the good). The more important criticism is that 
the solutions often do not follow what a prior cost-
benefit analysis may suggest and are only discovered 
through experimentation. The optimism about finding 
solutions makes possibilism attractive, but as a guide 
to action, relying too much on discovering solutions 
through trial and error can have a high failure rate. 
Possibilism argues that the best way to succeed is 
to engage in action, learn from failures, experiment 
and innovate, and then try again. Hirschman (1967) 
famously argued in his classic Development Projects 
Observed that if we knew all the unexpected 
obstacles that would emerge, we would not want 
to start most collective projects. However, as he 
shows with many examples, if we did not begin, we 
would also not know the creative solutions through 
which these obstacles are actually overcome through 
trial and error. This describes how many collective 
problems are actually often solved, but it does not 
give enough weight to the many repeated failures in 
difficult areas, and the consequences of that.
Strategic realism combines the optimism of 
possibilism with a realistic analysis of feasibility. It 
informs the SOAS-ACE research programme (Khan, 
et al. 2019) identifying high-impact but feasible 
anti-corruption strategies. It agrees with possibilism 
that a cost-benefit analysis is unlikely on its own to 
predict the success of collective action. This is not 
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only because there may be considerable uncertainty 
about the numbers (as possibilism points out), but 
also because the costs of contributing to a particular 
solution do not capture the likely intensity of 
resistance from groups concerned with protecting 
their distribution of benefits. It also agrees with 
possibilism that leadership, experimentation and 
learning from mistakes are important for success. 
But strategic realism also differs from possibilism 
in saying that it is important to assess the relative 
feasibility of different policies that may take us 
towards the objective. There are different ways of 
doing anti-corruption, just as there are different ways 
of crossing a river, and all of them are not equally 
difficult. Like the cost-benefit approach, strategic 
realism looks at data, but recognizes margins of 
error and uncertainty. But it also looks look at the 
organization of the society and sector to assess 
the relative power of relevant organisations, their 
interests and capabilities and their likely support for 
or resistance to particular solutions.
Any new policy faces transition costs because 
groups who lose out will try to resist or distort 
implementation in different ways (Khan 1995). 
A political economy analysis can give us an idea of 
the relative transition costs associated with different 
policies given the distribution of power and interests 
in that context. This can help assess the likelihood of 
each policy being implemented, or the ways in which 
they may be distorted when implemented. The fact 
that we cannot give a precise number to these relative 
costs (for all the reasons that possibilism identifies) 
does not mean that we should dispense with the 
attempt to assess the relative resistance facing 
different policies. Adopting a line of attack without 
doing such an analysis, when more feasible paths may 
have been pursued, condemns leaders and followers 
to a high probability of disappointment. 
Strategic realism is particularly important in areas 
like anti-corruption in developing countries where, 
despite mass support, collective action has delivered 
disappointing results.
Figure 1: Understanding collective action
Strategic Realism
(SOAS-ACE)
Possibilism
(Hirschman)
Costs and Benefits 
(Olson, Game Theory)
Source: author
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The importance of feasibility 
The attractiveness of possibilism is that it encourages 
experimentation and sees the future as open. It 
provides a theoretical justification for organising 
collective action in difficult areas where there is 
always a chance of failure. The disadvantage is that 
it does not identify and work around constraints that 
are very hard to overcome in the short run, however 
persistent and innovative the experimentation. Some 
of these are arithmetic constraints, like the amount 
of tax resources available. This can change but very 
slowly, so if a ‘solution’ assumes greater tax revenues 
than are likely to be available, it is likely to fail. Other 
constraints describe the relative power of different 
organisations and the ways in which they protect their 
interests. These too can change within margins, but 
big changes are less likely in the short run. 
Failing to identify difficult-to-change factors, which 
we describe as structural constraints, is a problem. If 
analysis could identify collective action whose success 
depended on changing variables that are more likely 
to be changeable – even if we do not know precisely 
how – we could dramatically improve the chances 
of success. Many strategies of collective action fail 
because they rely on an extreme interpretation of 
possibilism for their success. For experimentation to 
be worthwhile, and for leaders to be able to justify 
the sacrifices of their followers, the proposed solution 
must be feasible in that context. 
What do we mean by feasible? We mean that 
even if we cannot foresee all the adjustments 
and innovations that need to be made to make 
the strategy implementable, the evidence on the 
structure of the economy and the distribution of 
organisational interests and capabilities suggests 
that: a) any additional resources required to make 
the solution work are within the feasible space of the 
country or sector; b) while some powerful groups 
are inevitably going to lose out, there are powerful 
supporters who may in their own interest support 
the implementation of the policy; and c) that the 
proposed incentives, and feasible checks and balances 
are likely to be adequate to get the relevant players 
to change their behaviour. The case for this has to be 
made on the basis of evidence, but a broader range of 
evidence than in the cost-benefit approach. 
Applying the test of a feasible solution would rule 
out, for instance, many anti-corruption policies that 
collective action has tried to institute in developing 
countries. These policies include transparency 
strategies to reveal how corrupt politicians and 
bureaucrats are making money so that voters can 
vote them out, mass mobilisations to message citizens 
to report corrupt acts, setting up anti-corruption 
commissions, and demanding stricter and quicker 
penalties for corruption. These strategies have 
achieved varying degrees of success, but in most poor 
countries, the results have been disappointing despite 
many different types of leadership initiatives. 
This is because many of these strategies are not only 
likely to face unexpected problems (as possibilism 
expects), they face predictable and severe obstacles 
that make innovative solutions unlikely. For instance, 
they assume that the societies in question are already 
largely rule-following and only a few people are 
breaking the rules. Identifying the few bad apples 
should quickly result in corrective action. But only 
societies that already have a wide dispersion of 
high-productivity activities are likely be generally 
rule-following because here powerful actors follow 
rules and support contract enforcement in their own 
interest (Khan 2018). 
The evidence tells us this is not the case in the typical 
developing country. Anti-corruption that attempts 
to work through a generalised enforcement of rules 
is likely to face growing resistance from a broad 
coalition of powerful interests and even ordinary 
people whose economic circumstances make them 
reliant on informal ways of doing business and politics. 
The collective action to implement such strategies 
is therefore unlikely to succeed even with much 
innovation and experimentation. It is not surprising 
that many such strategies have failed to achieve a 
significant effect on corruption in developing countries.
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Conclusion 
The optimism that drives possibilism is both a strength 
and a weakness. Strength, because without optimism 
political leadership and social activism are impossible 
to sustain. But it is also a weakness, because it can 
result in frequent disappointment and demoralisation 
if strategies are repeatedly pursued that have very low 
chances of effective implementation.  
An analysis of relative constraints can help to identify 
potential reforms whose implementation and 
operation is feasible. Implementing these reforms will 
still require much experimentation, innovation and 
leadership – leaders will still have to take risks in trying 
to change the status quo. But a calculated risk that has 
a higher chance of success is better than a leap into the 
unknown. 
Strategic realism can increase the chances of success of 
possibilist experimentation. It is therefore decidedly not 
structural determinism – it is not saying that the status 
quo is determined by structural constraints. That would 
be a bit like the position of Voltaire’s Dr Pangloss who 
thought we are always in the best of all possible worlds: 
if any improvement was possible, someone would 
already have brought it about. But strategic realism 
does say that some reforms are likely to face much 
greater resistance and distortion than others. 
Aligning interests and incentives – as we try to do in 
the SOAS-ACE approach to anti-corruption (Khan, 
et al. 2019) – applies the strategic realist approach 
to identify feasible policies that we can imagine 
being implemented. The evidence tells us that the 
achievement anti-corruption across the board may 
not be immediately feasible in the typical developing 
country. But our analysis of sectors and activities also 
shows many opportunities for designing sectoral anti-
corruption strategies that are likely to find sufficient 
support for implementation and operation and make a 
big difference to development outcomes. 
Identifying a portfolio of such opportunities for a 
reformist leadership or for social activists who want 
to really make a change will allow us to mobilise the 
optimism of the possibilist approach with a much 
lower chance of disappointment. This is important, 
because developing countries have a long way to go 
and repeated disappointments can demoralise people 
rather than spur them on. Successful implementation 
of small changes that make a big difference can 
gradually change structural constraints, which allows 
further changes to happen – a process that we describe 
as radical incrementalism. 
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Endnotes
1 The picture shows activists in Bangladesh demanding 
punishment for the collapse of a garments factory in 2005 
that killed 76 workers. They failed and in 2013 the Rana Plaza 
collapse led to more than a thousand deaths. The challenge 
of corruption in the factory inspection continues.
2 Based on a presentation at a roundtable event at the 
Development Studies Association DSA2020 conference on 
18 June 2020, organised by the Anti-Corruption Evidence 
research consortium at SOAS University of London (SOAS-
ACE) on how to make collective action effective (Panel 41: 
Aligning interests and incentives: Strategies for grassroots 
success; Convenor: Prof Mushtaq Khan, Discussant: Dr Pallavi 
Roy, Panelists: Prof Ahmirah El-Haddad, Mehnaz Rabbani 
and Dr Michael Uzoigwe, https://www.devstud.org.uk/
conference/conference-2020/panels/#8921). 
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